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Abstract
This paper extends the Atkinson-Stiglitz model of direct and indirect taxa-
tion to a dynamic setting with two unobservable characteristics: productive
ability and inherited wealth. Bequests are motivated by the “joy of giving”.
A child’s inheritance is a random variable with a probability distribution
that depends on his parent’s investment in a “bequest technology”. Public
borrowing is assumed and implies the modi…ed golden rule. We study the
optimal tax policy when two instruments are available: a non-linear (wage)
income tax and a proportional tax on capital income. We show that the
second instrument ought, in general, to be used but that the tax rate is not
necessarily positive. However, a positive tax rate is more likely when there
is a positive correlation between inherited wealth and innate ability.
1 Introduction
One of the most celebrated propositions in the optimal taxation literature
is the property that income taxation does not need to be supplemented by
commodity taxation, under a mild separability assumption. This proposi-
tion, which is due to Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), has several important
implications for the design of tax policy. In particular, it undermines the
role played by a number of tax instruments, including capital income taxa-
tion. When cast within the framework of an overlapping-generations model,
where taxes on both wage earnings and interest income are available, the
Atkinson and Stiglitz analysis implies that there should be no interest in-
come tax if the economy converges to the (modi…ed) golden rule.1.
Not surprisingly the Atkinson and Stiglitz proposition has been chal-
lenged with the concern of justifying the often observed coexistence of direct
and indirect taxation. Some authors have questioned the relevance of separa-
bility between consumption and leisure. Others have introduced arguments
of di¤erential compliance to explain why the two taxes are needed.2 Naito
(1999) and Pirtilla and Tuomala (1999), on the other hand, have shown
that indirect taxation may be desirable with non-linear technologies. Re-
cently Cremer et al. (2001) have presented an alternative objection to the
Atkinson and Stiglitz proposition. They consider a setting where individuals
di¤er in several unobservable characteristics (productivity and endowments)
and show that di¤erential commodity taxation remains a useful instrument
of tax policy, even if preferences are separable between labor and produced
goods.
This paper builds on Cremer et al. (2001) and studies the implications
1See Atkinson and Sandmo (1980). This argument that is generally developed in a
setting of optimal income taxation à la Mirrlees (1974) can readily be extended to the
case of linear wage income taxation. One then needs a stronger separability assumption
(such as implied, e.g., by the Stone-Geary utility function); see Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1980, p. 433).
2Boadway et al. (1994). See also Cremer and Gahvari (1995) who develop a direct-
indirect tax structure in a setting of uncertainty.
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of multi-dimensional heterogeneity for the taxation of savings. Our start-
ing point is the observation that in reality, and for all sorts of reasons, not
only ability but also part of inherited wealth may not be observable. If this
is the case, then an interest income tax might become desirable even with
separability. To be more precise, such a tax may then be an indirect way of
screening for the part of inherited endowment that is not public knowledge.
However, this essentially static argument is incomplete and leaves out some
crucial elements when it comes to the taxation of savings. To introduce
those, we depart from Cremer et al. (2001) in several respects. Most signif-
icantly, we account for the fact that inherited wealth (unlike endowments
in a static model) cannot be assumed to be exogenous and independent of
the tax policy. Our analysis shows that this is a very crucial feature; it
does not in general tend to make the taxation of capital income a redundant
instrument. However, it will a¤ect the level and possibly even the sign of
the optimal tax on interest income. In some cases, a negative tax on capital
income may be called for.
We consider a two-generations overlapping growth model in which indi-
viduals draw utility from present and future consumption, from leisure and
from the prospect of leaving their children a certain amount of wealth. Each
individual is characterized by two parameters: his productivity and his ini-
tial endowment. To keep the presentation simple, we assume that each of
these parameters can only take two values.3 Assuming that an optimal non-
linear income tax is implemented, we examine whether or not savings ought
to be taxed. In other words, taking …rst period consumption as a numeraire,
we study the optimal taxation of interest income, given that a non-linear
tax is imposed on wage earnings. We focus on the steady-state solution.
Capital accumulation is equal to saving and saving is motivated by two
concerns: second period consumption and bequests. We adopt a particular
bequest technology. There are two possible levels of bequest, low and high.
3Our analysis can be extended to to an arbitrary (but discrete) distribution of types.
2
The more the parent invests in this technology, the likelier his heirs will
inherit the high level. Bequests are motivated by a joy of giving argument
also called the “warm glow e¤ect” (Andreoni (1990)), as opposed to dynastic
altruism or strategic motivations.4 We shall come back on this assumptions
in the concluding section. Compared to Cremer et al. (2001), we endogenize
the prices, here the interest rate and the wage level, and we close the model
by providing a source of inherited endowment.5
Anticipating the results, we …nd two reasons for departing from the zero
capital income tax rule. The …rst is the same as in Cremer et al. (2001): by
taxing (or subsidizing) capital income, we indirectly reach inherited wealth
which by assumption escapes taxation. The second normally goes towards
subsidizing capital income because in our model the e¤ort toward bequeath-
ing generates additional resources to the economy and henceforth ought to
be encouraged. Finally, our paper makes a methodological contribution
which goes beyond the considered context of capital income taxation. The
endogeneity of inheritance means that we are e¤ectively studying an opti-
mal income tax problem where the proportions of types are endogenous and
depend on the tax instruments.6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
basic framework of the study. Section 3 then provides the formulas for op-
timal non linear income tax and optimal ad valorem interest income tax.
Section 4 considers an extension to the case where ability and wealth are
correlated.
4This assumption is not uncommon in the literature on the dynamics of wealth distri-
bution and on endogenous growth; see e.g. Glomm and Ravikumar (1992). Empirically,
that type of bequests appears to be at least as realistic as the dynastic bequests; see
Arrondel et al (1997).
5Ludden (2000) looks at a model close to Cremer et al. (2001) in a two-period setting.
6Other reasons for which proportions may be endogenous include mobility (tax com-
petition) and human capital accumulation.
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Figure 1 : The distribution of types
2 The framework
2.1 Households, production and capital accumulation
Consider an overlapping generation model where individuals live two peri-
ods. They supply labor in the …rst period and consume a composite good
in both periods. Assume for simplicity that there is no population growth.
In other words, each individual has just one child. Each generation consists
of households that have di¤erent productivity in the labor market and dif-
ferent inherited endowment. We consider two levels of productivity n and
n with n > n > 0 and two levels of inherited endowment ! and ! with
! > ! > 0. Consequently, there is a total of four types of households. The
proportion of type i = 1; : : : 4 in the population is denoted ¼i and is as-
sumed to be time-invariant for the time being; the indexing of the types is
illustrated on Figure 1.
All individuals have the same strictly quasi concave utility,
u
¡
ci; di; xi
¢ ¡ v ¡Li¢ (1)
where ci is …rst period consumption, di second period consumption, xi the
investment in the bequest technology, and Li the labor supply. Separability
is assumed for the sake of simplicity but also to keep in line with the Atkinson
and Stiglitz result.
The production side of economy is assumed to exhibit constant returns
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to scale with respect to labor and capital. Under perfect competition, …rms
do not make any pro…ts.7 The production utilizes two factors: capital K
and labor L; with:
L =
X
i
¼i ni Li:
We write the production function as Y = F (K; L) and thus production
prices are given by:
1 + r = FK and w = FL:
The rate of interest is r and the wage rate per e¢ciency unit is w: In other
words, the wage rate of an individual with productivity ni is wi = niw: Full
depreciation after one period is assumed.
It is interesting to write the resource constraint of the economy for each
period. To do so, we have to introduce time index. We thus have at date t:
F (Kt; Lt) +
X
i
¼it!
i = Kt+1 +
X
i
¼itc
i
t +
X
i
¼it¡1
¡
dit + x
i
t
¢
: (2)
We will also need an expression for the capital accumulation equation:
Kt+1 =
X
i
¼its
i
t ¡ Bt (3)
where sit is saving of individual i at date t, and Bt is public debt at date
t. Returns from saving are used to …nance second period consumption and
spending on the bequest technology to be de…ned below. These returns come
from the productive use of capital or from the interests on public debt.
As shown by Atkinson and Sandmo (1980), there are two reasons why a
tax-transfer on capital income can be desirable in a traditional overlapping
generation setting; see also Stiglitz (1987), Pestieau (1974) or Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1980). The …rst one is the complementarity between leisure and
7We assume an homogeneous production sector so that the objection to zero commodity
taxation made by Naito (1999) does not hold. In his model, imposing a commodity tax
on skilled labor-intensive goods is Pareto-improving.
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savings. The second one is the desire to achieve an optimal path of capi-
tal accumulation which, in the steady-state, means satisfying the modi…ed
golden rule. In this paper, we present additional arguments pro or con cap-
ital income taxation. To make our points crisper we abstract from these
two traditional arguments. Consequently, we assume separability between
leisure and saving. Furthermore, our setting includes a device to secure
optimality of capital accumulation, namely the public debt. This is one
of the mechanisms considered in the literature to obtain, in a decentral-
ized setting, the level of capital that would be chosen in a fully controlled
economy. Alternative devices include direct control of Kt, lump sum trans-
fers across generations and pay-as-you-go social security. The public debt
in our setting could be replaced by either of these mechanisms procedures
without a¤ecting the results. Without such a device our formula for capital
income taxation would include a term depending on the gap between the
rate of capital return and the rate of economic growth (which is here 0 in
the steady-state).8
It is important to realize that to induce the optimal capital accumulation,
one may have to transfer resources “downward”, namely from the old to the
young generation. This is the case if the laisser-faire (Diamond) equilibrium
implies under-accumulation (marginal productivity of capital lower than the
rate of economic growth). Concretely, such downward transfers mean nega-
tive social security bene…ts or a negative public debt. In the latter case, the
government saves instead of borrowing. This is of no relevance here as we
only use public borrowing as a way of securing the modi…ed golden rule in
the long run.
8What is crucial for the absence of such a term in our formula is not the modi…ed
golden rule per se but simply the fact that the (steady state) interest and wage rates
do not depend on the tax rate on capital. Our results would go through without any
modi…cation if the interest rate were set at an arbitrary level, e.g. the worldwide return
on capital in a small open economy setting.
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2.2 Tax instruments and household’s problem
Let us come back to the consumer’s problem. In the tradition of the optimal
income taxation literature, we assume that an individual’s productivity, ni;
and his labor supply, Li; are not observable by the tax administration. Yet,
his before tax labor income, I i = w ni Li; is public knowledge. This rules out
…rst-best taxation of types while nonlinear (labor) income taxation is avail-
able. Furthermore, neither personal spending levels, ci; di; xi; nor personal
net consumption zi = ci¡!i are publicly observable. The tax authority has
however information on anonymous transactions, in particular regarding the
payment of interest income.9 Under this circumstance, only linear taxation
on interest income is available. Finally, we assume that inherited wealth, !i,
is not observable. This extreme assumption captures the idea that a large
fraction of …nancial wealth is not reported at death in many countries. We
will take …rst period consumption as the numeraire. Therefore, the linear tax
on interest income is equivalent to a linear tax on second period spending.10
To sum up, the tax policy consists of a non linear tax T (I) on labor
income and a linear tax on saving at rate ¿ . The problem of individual of
type i is given by:
9Many European countries use (anonymous) withholding taxes on interest incomes
with rates around 15%.
10Consequently, the formal problem is the same as if the tax authority could directly
distinguish …rst period consumption from second period expenditures and tax them at
di¤erent rates. Let us brie‡y elaborate on the informational assumptions regarding capital
income and inherited wealth. Capital income is not observable at the individual’s level but
can be subject to a withholding tax, based on anonymous transactions. Inherited wealth,
on the other hand, is not observable, neither at an aggregate (or anonymous) level, nor
at the individual level. We also assume that the government cannot distinguish (even
anonymously) the two usages of savings: future consumption and bequest.
These assumption are inter-related. Non observability of inherited wealth explains why
individual saving is not common knowledge. Admittedly, in the real world, a part of
inherited wealth, particularly real estate, cannot be hidden. However, for our purpose it
is su¢cient that some inherited wealth (e.g., of …nancial nature), cannot be observed. In
the logic of our model, the government would impose a 100% tax on the observable wealth
and the rest of the results would hold through for the non observable part of wealth.
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max u
¡
cit; d
i
t+1; x
i
t+1
¢ ¡ v ¡Lit¢
s:t: cit + s
i
t = I
i
t ¡ T
¡
Iit
¢
+ !i ´ Rit; (4)
sit =
¡
dit+1 + x
i
t+1
¢
pt+1; (5)
Iit = wt n
i Lit (6)
where pt ´ 1=(1 + rt (1 ¡ ¿)) and Rit denotes the disposable income of indi-
vidual i; obtained from gross income by subtracting the tax on labor income
and adding inherited wealth.
Because of the separability of the preferences, the objective can be rewrit-
ten as:
max V
¡
pt+1; R
i
t
¢ ¡ v ¡Lit¢ ;
s:t: Rit = wt n
i Lit ¡ T
¡
wt n
iLit
¢
+ !i
where V is the indirect utility function associated with u, obtained by sub-
stituting the demand functions ci
¡
pt+1; Rit
¢
; di
¡
pt+1; Rit
¢
and xi
¡
pt+1; Rit
¢
into (1).
2.3 Bequest technology and the determination of each type’s
proportion
Up to now, we have taken as given the proportion of type i individuals,
¼it. We have thereby neglected one crucial feature of the model namely that
these proportions are endogenously determined. We assume that they are
determined by the parents’ bequest behavior and speci…cally by their choice
of x (which in turn is a¤ected by the tax policy). Consider for the time being
the simplest case where earning ability and bequest are independent random
variables (and thus not correlated). The proportion of able individuals, that
is those with productivity n, is denoted by Ã and that of individuals with
high endowment is 't. We assume that Ã is given but that 't results from
the bequest e¤ort xt¡1. More precisely, the probability that the child of a
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parent i (in generation t) receives a high endowment, !, is given by h
¡
xit
¢
,
with 0 · h ¡xit¢ · 1 and h0 ¡xit¢ > 0.11 The proportion of high wealth
individuals in the next generation will then be given by
't+1 =
X
i
¼ith
¡
xit
¢
: (7)
The proportions of the types in generation t + 1 are then determined ac-
cording to:
¼1t+1 =
¡
1 ¡ 't+1
¢
(1 ¡ Ã) for n; !;
¼2t+1 =
¡
1 ¡ 't+1
¢
Ã for n; !;
¼3t+1 = 't+1 (1 ¡ Ã) for n; !;
¼4t+1 = 't+1 Ã for n; !;
(8)
where 't+1 is de…ned by (7). Substituting (7) in (8) yields …rst-order di¤er-
ence equations in ¼it. Recall that n and ! are, for the time being, assumed
to be independent random variables. In the steady-state, ', and hence ¼i’s
become time invariant. However, they remain endogenous and depend on
the tax policy via the individual’s choices of x.
2.4 The government’s problem
We are now going to move to the government’s problem. Its objective is
to maximize an intertemporal social welfare function subject to a budget
constraint at each period of time. This budget constraint can be written as:
X
i
¡
¼itTt
¡
I it
¢
+ ¼it¡1¿ rt s
i
t¡1
¢
+ Bt ¡ Bt¡1 (1 + rt) = 0: (9)
By assumption the only purpose of taxation is redistributive. Using the
CRS property, the pricing equations, and (3)–(5), we check that (9) implies
(2). Consequently, budget constraint and resource constraint are equiva-
lent and welfare maximization can be considered subject to either of these
constraints.
11Recall that xi enters the parent’s utility function. In particular, we can think about
u as depending on h
¡
xi
¢
i.e., the probability that the child of individual i inherits ¹!. For
instance, the utility of a parent could be speci…ed as: u
¡
ci; di; xi
¢
= ¹u
¡
ci; di
¢
+ h
¡
xi
¢
.
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In addition, the incentive compatibility constraints have to be satis…ed.
Types being private information, one has to be sure that no individual mim-
ics another. These constraints imply that individual i = 1; : : : ; 4 when he
consumes
¡
I it ; R
i
t
¢
has a utility
U it = V
¡
pt+1; R
i
t
¢ ¡ v µ Iit
niwt
¶
;
that is at least equal to the utility level he would obtain by choosing
¡
Iht ; R
h
t
¢
,
h = 1; : : : ; 4. Consequently we must have:
U it > U iht = V
³
p; Rih
´
¡ v
µ
Iht
ni wt
¶
;
where
Riht = R
h
t + !
i ¡ !h:
The objective of the social planner is to maximize the discounted sum
of utilities U it , the discount factor ° (< 1) re‡ecting the social rate of time
preference. We can now write the Lagrangean expression with the multipli-
ers ¸t associated with the resource constraints, ¹iht ; with the self-selection
constraints, ´'t with constraint (7) and ´
i
t with constraint (8).
$ =
X
t
°t
(X
i
£
¼itU
i
t
¤
+¸t
"
F
ÃX
i
¼it¡1
¡
dit + x
i
t
¢
pt ¡ Bt¡1;
X
i
¼itn
iLit
!
+
X
i
¼it!
i
¡
X
i
¼itR
i
t + Bt ¡
X
i
¼it¡1
¡
dit + x
i
t
¢#
+
X
i;h
¹iht
³
U it ¡ U iht
´
+ ´'t
ÃX
i
¼ith
¡
xit
¢ ¡ 't+1
!
+´1t
¡
¼1t ¡ (1 ¡ 't) (1 ¡ Ã)
¢
+ ´2t
¡
¼2t ¡ (1 ¡ 't)Ã
¢
+´3t
¡
¼3t ¡ 't (1 ¡ Ã)
¢
+ ´4t
¡
¼4t ¡ 'tÃ
¢)
: (10)
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This expression is to be maximized with respect to Rit, L
i
t, Bt, ¼
i
t, 't and pt.
Note that controlling Lit or I
i
t = wtn
iLit is equivalent in the present setting.
Recall that dit = d
i
¡
pt+1; R
i
t
¢
and xit = x
i
¡
pt+1; R
i
t
¢
. We …rst di¤erentiate
$ with respect to Bt and obtain:
@$
@Bt
= °t¸t ¡ °t+1¸t+1 (1 + rt+1) = 0: (11)
This equation determines the e¢cient amount of capital accumulation along
the growth path. The same condition would be obtained if Kt were directly
controlled by a social planner. As already mentioned, this condition can
very well imply negative values of Bt. In the steady-state (11) leads to the
modi…ed Golden rule:
(1 + r) = °¡1 > 1; (12)
given that population does not grow. With this rule, we make sure that both
producer prices r and w are constant in the steady-state. We also make sure
that our tax instruments are not used to achieve the desired level of capital
accumulation.
3 The optimal tax on capital income
To study the determination of the tax on capital income, we now turn to
the optimality conditions with respect to Rit and pt+1.
12 For the steady-state
12The …rst-order condition with respect to Lit is not directly relevant for our purpose
and is therefore omitted.
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they are as follows:
@$
@Ri
=
Ã
¼i +
X
h
¹ih
!
@V
@R
¡
p; Ri
¢
¡¸¼i
µ
1 ¡ ¿rp
µ
@di
@R
¡
p;Ri
¢
+
@xi
@R
¡
p; Ri
¢¶¶
¡
X
h
¹hi
@V
@R
³
p; Rhi
´
+ ´'¼
ih
0 ¡
xi
¢ @xi
@Ri
= 0; (13)
@$
@p
=
X
i
Ã
¼i +
X
h
¹ih
!
@V
@p
¡
p; Ri
¢
+¸
X
i
¼i
µ¡
di + xi
¢
(1 + r) + ¿rp
µ
@di
@p
+
@xi
@p
¶¶
¡
X
h;i
¹hi
@V
@p
³
p; Rhi
´
+ ´'
X
i
¼ih0
¡
xi
¢ @xi
@p
= 0; (14)
where we use the equality ¿rp = p (1 + r) ¡ 1. Di¤erentiating $ with re-
spect to ¼i (i = 1; : : : ; 4) and ' yields the following additional …rst-order
conditions:
@$
@¼i
= U i + ¸
µ
T
¡
I i
¢
+
¿rsi
1 + r
¶
+ ´i + ´'h
¡
xi
¢
= 0 i = 1; : : : ; 4;(15)
@$
@'
= ´1 (1 ¡ Ã) + ´2Ã ¡ ´3 (1 ¡ Ã) ¡ ´4Ã ¡ ´'(1 + r) = 0: (16)
We now combine (13) and (14) by taking
P
i
@$
@Ri
¡
di + xi
¢
(1 + r)+
@$
@p
: This
gives:
¿rp¸
P
i
¼i
Ã
@ ~di
@p
+
@~xi
@p
!
+
P
h;i
¹hi
@V
@R
¡
p;Rhi
¢ ¡
!h ¡ !i¢
+´'
P
i
¼ih0
¡
xi
¢ @~xi
@p
= 0;
or
¿rp =
P
h;i
¹hi
@V
@R
¡
p;Rhi
¢ ¡
!h ¡ !i¢ + ´' P
i
¼ih0
¡
xi
¢ @~xi
@p
¡¸P
i
¼i
Ã
@ ~di
@p
+
@~xi
@p
! : (17)
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In this formula, ~xi and ~di denote the compensated demand for bequest
investment and second period consumption. The derivatives with respect to
p are negative. The multiplier ´' is the shadow price of '; the expected
proportion of wealthy heirs. One can expect that ´' > 0 as an increase in
' implies an increase in aggregate wealth in this steady-state economy; see
below.
The left hand side of (17) is an increasing function of ¿ , the tax rate on
capital income. Observe that one can interpret ¿rp as the per unit tax on
x and d; recall that ¿rp = p (1 + r) ¡ 1.13. This interpretation is useful to
facilitate the comparison with the results in Cremer et al. (2001).
The right-hand side of (17) consists of three di¤erent terms of which two
have a familiar ‡avor. First, the denominator, which is positive, re‡ects the
substitution e¤ects and, hence, the distortions created by the tax on capital
income (and thus on second period expenditures). If the two (compensated)
demands are highly inelastic, there is a good case for a high tax or subsidy
depending on the sign of the numerator. This is similar to the inverse
elasticity rule derived in the Ramsey model.
The …rst term of the denominator is the weighted sum of the di¤erence
between the mimicker’s endowment and the mimicked’s endowment. This
term is positive if the incentive constraints bind from high to low wealth
individuals. In that case the taxation of second period expenditures is used
as an imperfect substitute for the taxation of (unobservable) wealth. As
Cremer et al. (2001) have shown, this depends on a number of factors in-
cluding the correlation between ability and wealth. In the case of zero
correlation considered up to now, it appears to be tempting to conjecture
that the utilitarian solution would imply that the incentive constraint are
binding downward according to wealth and ability (even though not all of
these constraints would be binding). However, within a multi-dimensional
setting such intuition can be misleading and no general result as for the sign
13We also have p(x+d) = s, so that the tax on interest income ¿rs is equal to ¿rp(x+d).
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if this term can be obtained. We shall show below how the results change if
wealth and ability are allowed to be correlated.
Turning now to the second term of the numerator of (17) it is negative
when ´' > 0, which can be expected (as long as h
0 > 0). To see this let us
have a closer look at the interpretation of this Lagrange multiplier. First, it
is interesting to observe that the utilitarian full information solution would
imply:
´' = ¸(! ¡ !): (18)
To obtain this expression, we have used (15)–(16) and the property that
types 1 and 3 on the one hand and 2 and 4 on the other hand are treated
identically at a …rst-best utilitarian optimum.14 Expression (18) shows that
in a …rst best world, the impact on welfare of an increase in the proportion
of wealthy individual is simply equal to the social value of the di¤erence
in endowments; recall that ¸ is the multiplier of the government’s budget
constraint. In the second best setting with unobservable types and binding
incentive constraints considered here, the expression for ´' is more compli-
cated. Combining (15)–(16) one obtains:
´'(1 ¡ a) = Ã
·µ
U4 + ¸(T 4 +
¿rs4
1 + r
¶
¡ ¡U2 + ¸(T 2 + ¿rs2¢¸ +
(1 ¡ Ã)
·µ
U3 + ¸(T 3 +
¿rs3
1 + r
¶
¡
µ
U1 + ¸(T 1 +
¿rs1
1 + r
¶¸
; (19)
with 0 < a < 1. In words, ´' is proportional to the average di¤erence
between the contribution of high wealth and low wealth individuals to social
welfare.15 Using the incentive constraint along with some weak normality
conditions one can show that (19) implies ´' > 0.
14Recall that preferences are separable. It is than easy to verify that the …rst-best
utilitarian solution yields: I1 = I3; I2 = I4; R1 = R2 = R3 = R4; x1 = x2 = x3 = x4;
U1 = U3 and U2 = U4.
15Recall that types 4 and 2 on the one hand and 3 and 1 on the other hand have the
same productivity but di¤er in wealth. An increase in ' increases the proportion of types
4 and 2 at the expense of types 3 and 1.
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It follows from these arguments that the presence of this second term
tends to decrease the tax rate on capital income. This is because an increase
in ¿ brings about a decrease in the individuals (compensated) investment
in the bequest technology. This reduces the proportion of high wealth in-
dividuals and thus makes society poorer. Interestingly, this wealth e¤ect is
not associated with an impact on capital accumulation. The steady state
capital stock is determined according to (12) and is thus independent of the
tax policy. This second term captures the idea that x not only provides
some utility to bequeathers but also creates a positive externality on the
economy. Consequently, it can be viewed as a Pigouvian subsidy.16 Note
that in a …rst-best setting, this Pigouvian subsidy would only apply to x
and not to both x and d as here.
To further clarify the interpretation of (17) it is useful to look at two
special (extreme) cases:
² Case 1: ¹hi = 0; 8h; i such that !h 6= !i. In words, incentive con-
straints bind only between types who have identical wealth. This
would be the case for instance if inherited wealth were observable (see
the Conclusion for further discussion of such a setting). Then the …rst
term on the RHS of (17) vanishes, and we are left with the second term
which calls for a subsidization of savings. The taxation of savings has
no redistributive (traditional optimal tax) role to play here, and only
the Pigouvian (externality correcting) e¤ect is relevant.
² Case 2: h0(x) = 0: parents cannot a¤ect the probability distribution
of their child’s endowment (and would then of course set x at zero).
Here we are left with the traditional optimal tax considerations and
16We have de…ned the …rst- and the second-best objective of the social planner as the
utilitarian sum of individuals’ utilities, including the terms pertaining to x. Consequently,
bequests contribute twice to welfare: …rst through their e¤ect on individuals’ utility and
second through their e¤ect on aggregate inherited resources '! + (1 ¡ ')!. If instead
we had chosen to purge individuals’ utilities from their altruistic component, the social
desirability of bequests would have been smaller and the case for a Pigouvian subsidy
weaker than in the current speci…cation.
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the possibility to have a positive tax on savings.
Summing up, we do not obtain what would be the counterpart of Atkin-
son and Stiglitz’s result: the tax on capital income (or equivalently on second
period expenditures) is not made redundant by the general income tax. Put
di¤erently, the optimal tax rate on capital income is not in general equal
to zero. However, at this point, there does not appear to be a compelling
case for imposing a positive tax on capital income. The possibility that the
optimal tax rate implied by (17) is negative cannot be ruled out.
4 Correlation between ability and wealth
So far we have assumed that ability and wealth were independent random
variables. This has allowed us to make the description of the bequest technol-
ogy and of the determination of the types’ proportions as simple as possible.
We shall now show how this setting can be generalized to allow for correla-
tion between the two individual characteristics. Let ½ 2 [¡1; 1] denote the
coe¢cient of correlation between n and !, and assume that it is exogenously
given and constant over time. The case of a positive correlation is of course
the one which appears empirically the most appealing, but our formal model
allows also for negative correlation.
For simplicity we continue to assume that the conditional probabilities
of n and n are independent of wealth.17. Consequently, the proportion of
able individual will be Ã, both among the high wealth and the low wealth
individuals. This is exactly similar to the case with ½ = 0 considered above.
The new feature which is introduced here is that the conditional probability
of inheriting a high level of wealth now depends on n. Let us de…ne 'L
and 'H as the probability of inheriting a high level of wealth given that
17This essentially amounts to assuming that while parents’ have an impact on their
children’s inheritance, they cannot a¤ect abilities. Alternatively, we could have assumed
two levels of (conditional) probabilities for n, ÃL and ÃH , depending on the inherited
wealth. This complicate the expression for ½, (22), while leaving the main conclusions
una¤ected.
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productivity is low or high respectively. With these additional, the steady
state version of (8) can be rewritten as:
¼1t+1 =
¡
1 ¡ 'Lt+1
¢
(1 ¡ Ã)
¼2t+1 =
¡
1 ¡ 'Ht+1
¢
Ã
¼3t+1 = '
L
t+1 (1 ¡ Ã)
¼4t+1 = '
H
t+1 Ã:
(20)
Now, the proportion of individuals inheriting ! is given by 't = '
L
t (1 ¡ Ã)+
'Ht Ã. We continue to assume that the probability of any given child of in-
heriting ! is given by the level of h
¡
xit
¢
chosen by its parent. This implies
that like before 't+1 is equal to the average level of h
¡
xit
¢
, and (7) is replaced
by:
't+1 = '
L
t+1 (1 ¡ Ã) + 'Ht+1 Ã =
X
¼it h
¡
xit
¢
: (21)
Observe that the coe¢cient of correlation can easily be expressed as a func-
tion of 'H and 'L and we have:
½ =
¡
'Ht+1 ¡ 'Lt+1
¢
(1 ¡ Ã) Ã
't+1
¡
1 ¡ 't+1
¢
+ Ã (1 ¡ Ã) : (22)
With the assumption that ½ is given (and constant over time) expression
(20)–(22) then completely determine the dynamics and the steady state
values of proportions ¼i’s and '.
The interesting feature is that all this has very little impact on the
speci…cation of the Lagrangean expression for the government’s problem.
Starting from (10), the Lagrangean in Section 2.4, one just has to replace the
last four constraints by their counterpart obtained from (20) while adding
(22) as a new constraint. It then immediately follows that the expression
for the optimal tax on capital income is not a¤ected and continues to be
given by (17). The actual level of ¿ as well as the interpretation of (17) do
however depend on the degree of correlation.
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To see this, observe that the case where incentive constraints are bind-
ing from high to low wealth individuals becomes increasingly likely as the
correlation increases; see Cremer et al. (2001). At the limit, when there is
perfect positive correlation (½ = 1), it is easy to see that this is necessarily
true. This is because under perfect correlation, we return to a standard sin-
gle dimensional setting for which one easily determines that the downward
incentive constraints bind at the utilitarian solution. In this case, the …rst
term in the denominator of (17) is thus necessarily positive. Furthermore,
the case of perfect correlation is only possible if h0(x) ´ 0 so that the second
term must also be zero.18.
To sum up, when ½ = 1, a positive tax on capital income is necessarily
optimal. Here the case for taxing capital income as a substitute for unob-
servable bequest is of course strongest. We can expect the same type of
conclusion to emerge (by continuity) when correlation is not perfect, but
su¢ciently high. And we know from the previous section that ½ = 0 may or
may not qualify as “su¢ciently high” from this perspective. Finally, when
½ < 0 a negative tax on capital income (i.e., a subsidy) becomes increasingly
likely. We can then have the case that both terms in the numerator of (17)
are negative. However, it has to be pointed out that this is not guaranteed
either, even in the case where ½ = ¡1. In such a situation the direction of
binding self-selection constraints would depend on the relative importance
of wealth and productivity di¤erentials.
5 Conclusion
The starting point of this paper was the now classic Atkinson and Stiglitz’s
proposition that with separability between consumption and leisure, there is
no need to tax capital income; non linear income tax is su¢cient both to raise
18 If the parent knows that he cannot in‡uence the probability of his child receiving ¹!
because this probability only depends on his child’s ability, why would he bother leaving
him any bequest ?
18
revenue and to redistribute resources across households. While keeping the
separability assumption, we have added one feature to Stiglitz’s [1985; 1987]
overlapping generations model, namely the desire of parents to leave some
bequests to their heirs. Consequently, individuals are characterized not only
by their unobservable level of productivity but also by an equally unobserv-
able level of inherited wealth. Even though we realize that a non negligible
part of inheritance can be observed by taxing authorities, the fact that part
of it currently escapes tax control is su¢cient to justify such an assumption.
In our model, there are two sources of output: a standard CRS technol-
ogy which is subject to the modi…ed golden rule through public debt and a
linear technology which transforms a certain amount of bequests into some
inherited wealth. Such a speci…cation makes it desirable no to tax but to
subsidize saving. There is however a good reason for taxing saving; it can
indeed be an indirect way of taxing inherited wealth and thus of redistribut-
ing resources across households. This reason is particularly persuasive when
there is some correlation between labor productivity and inherited …nancial
endowment.
Throughout this paper we have assumed that inherited wealth, was not
observable. If, instead, !i’s were observable, the results would of course be
quite di¤erent. The …rst term in the denominator of the RHS of (17) would
then vanish because incentive constraints between types with di¤erent !’s
are irrelevant. Consequently, one is then left with the second term pushing
for a subsidy on savings. Observe that a 100 % tax on bequests would then
be desirable.19 We thus return to the Atkinson and Stiglitz setting with a
single source of heterogeneity. The tax on savings then has no redistributive
role to play. However, the external e¤ect of x, namely its impact on the
proportion of types remains relevant so that a Pigouvian subsidy is called
for.
19To show this, on can derive the …rst order condition of the governments problem with
respect to Ii and combine it with (13). From the resulting expression it directly follows
that ni = nj implies Ii = Ij , and Ri = Rj , so that T i ¡ T j = !i ¡ !j ; i; j = 1; : : : ; 4.
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Finally, let us come back to our bequest motive. We use a joy of giving
speci…cation (also called paternalistic altruism) rather than an approach
based on accidental or purely altruistic bequests. This raises two questions.
First, one may wonder whether it is legitimate for the social planner to
include this altruistic component in its objective? Harsanyi and Hammond
believe that it should be dropped.20 Then our optimal tax system would
be less biased towards saving and the case for a positive capital income
taxation would be strengthened. In this paper, we have decided not to
follow Harsanyi and Hammond and not to “launder” individuals’ utilities.
The second question concerns the implications of considering alternative
assumptions, such as a speci…cation based on pure altruism à la Barro or
an accidental inheritance setting. Pure altruism makes the household prob-
lem quite di¢cult. Without randomness, we know from Chamley (1986)
and Lucas that capital income taxation should not be taxed. Given our
informational structure, what would be the behavior of an agent having an
in…nite horizon but facing a bequest technology that can yield a zero inheri-
tance if the low endowment is zero? This problem is close to that studied by
Gevers and Michel (1998). It is not impossible that the government has no
role in such an economy. Even if there is room for government intervention,
its implication will be surely di¤erent from the ones we have studied. Acci-
dental bequests constitute yet another alternative setting. They have been
considered in a recent paper by Boadway, Marchand and Pestieau (2000)
whose conclusions are quite close to those obtained in our paper.
20See e.g., Hammond (1988).
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